Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Recent evidence from experimental economics indicates that the sluggishness of consumers' response to price changes may be due to insufficient price knowledge (Jessoe and Rapson, 2014) . Ignoring this fact in estimating demand responses may result in elasticity estimates that incorrectly reflect the responses of consumers who are aware of prices. Further obstacles to consistently estimating demand elasticities emerge from the prevalence of tariffs that include a fixed fee, as this would lead to endogeneity bias (Taylor et al., 2004) . This kind of tariff is standard in numerous retail markets, such as telecommunications, water, natural gas, as well as electricity markets. Endogeneity issues are all the more relevant if consumers are free to choose from a broad range of tariffs. Such is the circumstance in Germany since the liberalization of the electricity markets in the European Union (EU) in 1998.
Employing an instrumental-variable (IV) approach to cope with the likely endogenous tariff choice, this article estimates the households' response to power price changes based on panel data originating from Germany's Residential Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS) for the years 2011 and 2012, thereby adding to the growing literature on the price responsiveness of residential electricity demand by investigating the role that information plays in influencing customer response. While being a standard method for dealing with the endogeneity of an explanatory variable, IV approaches are less frequently applied with respect to estimating electricity demand responses. A rare exception is the study by Alberini and Fillipini (2011) , who explicitly instrument for price to remedy the measurement error in their price variable.
As instrument for the endogenous price variable, we use the composite of grid and licence fees. Given that these fees are part of the end-use price and account for about 26% of average household prices, our instrument is clearly correlated with the endogenous price variable. Moreover, these fees are set by grid operators and are fixed at the regional level, so that it is highly warranted to assume that this price component is exogenous to consumers and, hence, does not affect consumers' tariff choice. Using 1 components of a tariff as a source of exogenous variation, such as grid and licence fees, we follow a fairly common identification strategy in the empirical literature (e. g. Ito (2014) ). A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we exploit sample information on the households' knowledge about power prices. On this basis, we combine the IV approach with an Endogenous Switching Regression Model to estimate price elasticities for two groups of households, finding that only those households that are informed about prices are sensitive to price changes, whereas the electricity demand of uninformed households is entirely price-inelastic.
These results suggest increasing the transparency of tariffs and cast doubt on both the efficacy and the welfare effects of Germany's eco-tax, which was introduced in 1999 to curb the greenhouse gas emissions from electricity consumption. This tax contributed to the doubling of the electricity prices for households since the beginning of the new millennium (BDEW, 2017:29) , when prices reached their minimum after the liberalization of the electricity market in 1998. A key consequence of this liberalization for households was the opportunity to freely choose their electricity provider. The improved competition was not sufficient, however, to moderate retail prices (Ros, 2017) , which primarily increased due to the introduction of new taxes and levies (BNetzA, 2017) . Currently, taxes and levies account for slightly more than half of the power prices for German households (BDEW, 2017:30) .
Another key reason for rising power prices was the introduction of a feed-in tariff scheme to support renewable energy technologies in 2000 (Andor et al., 2017a) . While this support scheme was very effective in increasing the share of green electricity in gross production, from less than 7% in 2000 to around 36% in 2017 (BDEW, 2018), the resulting burden for consumers particularly mounted in recent years, above all due to the exploding expansion of photovoltaic capacities (Frondel et al., 2015) . As a consequence, the levy with which electricity consumers have to finance the support for green electricity more than quadrupled between 2009 and 2018, increasing from 1.31 to 6.79 cents per kWh. Today, German households have to bear electricity prices that are -in terms of purchasing power standards -the highest in the EU (Eurostat, 2017 ). Yet, whether the doubling of average household electricity prices since 2000 has induced substantial reductions in electricity demand critically depends on households' responsiveness to price changes.
Based on our key empirical result that only price-conscious consumers exhibit a price-elastic demand and given that Germany's electricity production still largely rests on coal and natural gas, an important policy implication suggests itself: to dampen the electricity consumption of the household sector and its environmental impact, lowcost information measures, such as increasing the transparency of tariffs, should be implemented on a large scale in order to increase the saliency of prices.
The subsequent section provides a brief review of the literature on the residential demand for electricity. Section 3 concisely summarizes our database, followed by the presentation of the estimation results in Sections 4 and 5. Based on our empirical results, Section 6 presents some policy recommendations. The last section closes with a summary and conclusions.
Findings from the Literature
The received empirical literature suggests that price knowledge may substantially alter the demand for goods and services. For instance, analyzing the effect of detailed price information presented on water bills, Gaudin (2006) finds that households that are aware of price levels are considerably more sensitive to price changes than priceignorant households. In a similar vein, examining the effect of price knowledge for various utility services, Carter and Milon (2005) also conclude that informed households are more responsive to price changes than those without any clue about prices.
For electricity markets, though, empirical evidence on the impact of price information is scarce and primarily available for markets with real-time or time-of-use pricing schemes. Investigating the impact of price information on demand patterns under time-of-use pricing, recent studies, such as Harding and Lamarche (2016) and Pon (2017) , detect a large price response due to intra-day demand shifting. With respect to real-time pricing, Martin and Rivers (2018) find evidence that households respond to this information in part by forming habits, rather than adjusting their load-shifting behavior, resulting in a reduction in average electricity consumption of about 3%, an effect that is roughly constant across hours of the day. This result is based on a largescale field deployment in which close to 7,000 households were provided with realtime feedback on electricity consumption and prices. Exploring the implications of real-time pricing for Swedish households, Vesterberg and Krishnamurthy (2016) also estimate small cost savings from shifting load up to five hours ahead. These results indicate weak incentives for households and retailers to adopt dynamic pricing of electricity.
There are also studies that investigate the effect of information on usage, rather than prices, on electricity demand. Based on experimental data from Japan, Matsukawa (2004) , for instance, measures the effects of usage information received from a monitoring device on residential demand for electricity, the results indicating that this information contributed to energy conservation. Another example is the randomized control trial used by Jessoe and Rapson (2014) to test the effect of high-frequency information about residential electricity usage on the price elasticity of demand. These authors provide experimental evidence that informed households are more responsive to temporary price increases, concluding that inefficiencies due to imperfect information about product attributes can be overcome by providing easy-to-grasp information on a low-cost basis.
Our empirical analysis adds to this line of inquiry by providing evidence on the effect of price knowledge on electricity consumption levels in retail markets without real-time or time-of-use pricing schemes. Although the demand for electricity has been investigated by economists ever since its discovery, no broad consensus has been reached about the size of the response of residential electricity demand to changing power prices. In fact, price elasticity estimates cover a large range, stretching from 0, that is, an entirely price-inelastic demand, to a highly elastic response as indicated by an elasticity estimate of about -2.5 (Alberini and Fillipini, 2011; Fell et al., 2014; Labandeira et al., 2006; Reiss and White, 2005; Schulte and Heindl, 2017; Shin, 1985; Taylor, 1975) .
A key reason for these huge discrepancies is the specification of the price variable (Espey et al., 2004) . While a central assumption in economic theory is that consumers optimize with respect to marginal prices (Ito, 2014:537) , recent empirical findings suggest that consumers tend to react to alternative price measures. Ito (2014) , for instance, finds strong evidence that households respond to average prices, rather than (expected) marginal prices. By analyzing the price measure issue as well, Borenstein (2009) comes to similar conclusions, claiming that, as a consequence of the nonlinearity of tariffs, consumers do not respond to marginal prices due to the lack of precise price knowledge.
While such results suggest the use of average prices in estimating demand responses, this approach can lead to biased results if tariffs entail a fixed fee. While Baker et al. (1989) claim that the bias due to fixed fees is small, Taylor et al. (2004) argue that large magnitudes of price elasticity estimates, as well as good model fits, are just statistical artifacts of the usage of the average price as price measure, with the average price ap being defined as follows:
where q denotes consumption, mp designates the marginal price, and f the fixed fee.
In fact, it is straightforward to demonstrate that ∂ ln q ∂ ln ap , the price elasticity of demand, approaches -1 if the average price ap is much larger than the marginal price mp: ap >> mp. Rearranging definition (1) yields q = f /(ap − mp) and, hence, (ap − mp) . This derivative constitutes the demand elas-5 ticity with respect to the average price ap:
where the last term approaches -1 for ap >> mp.
In sum, irrespective of the service under scrutiny, we arrive at the general conclusion that in case of tariffs that include a fixed fee, using average prices for estimating price elasticities may lead to the overestimation of demand responses. This issue is highly relevant for our analysis, as the dominating pricing model in Germany's retail market for electricity includes two components: a fixed fee, whose annual amount varies between e0 and e1,000 for our sample households, and a constant marginal price per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Note also that the average price is an endogenous measure, as, by definition, it is a function of electricity consumption, the dependent variable of our analysis.
As these arguments cast doubt on the usage of average prices when estimating price responses, in our empirical approach, we employ marginal prices as the sole price
measure. This appears to be all the more warranted, as it is more easy for German households to find the constant marginal price per kWh on their bill than to calculate the average price per kWh by dividing total payments by total consumption. If at all, therefore, German households are aware of marginal prices, rather than the average cost per kWh. This strongly contrasts with countries such as the U. S., in which nonlinear block tariffs dominate the retail electricity markets and, hence, the information cost of understanding the marginal price of electricity is likely to be substantial (Ito, 2014:560) . By contrast, block tariffs are entirely absent in Germany.
Data
Our analysis draws on a rich panel data set originating from a retrospective survey among about 8,500 households conducted in 2014 as part of the German Residential 6 Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS), a survey that has been regularly commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy (BMWi) for more than a decade (RWI and forsa, 2018) . In addition to information on electricity consumption and cost, which households report from their electricity bills for the years 2011 and 2012, this survey provides for detailed information on socio-economic and other household characteristics, such as household size and household net income, age and education of the household head, and ownership of the household's residence. 1
All this information is self-reported under close guidance of a state-of-the art survey tool that provides visual assistance to the respondents, particularly with respect to electricity bills. For example, after being asked to indicate their electricity provider, respondents received a picture of the respective billing sheet, with the position of the required information being highlighted on the billing sheet -for more information, see RWI and forsa (2015) . Data on grid and license fees at the 5-digit postcode level for the years 2011 and 2012 were purchased from ene't, a professional provider of energyrelated data. Information on whether a household resides in a rural or urban area, available from the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis 2015) , completes our database.
The billing information includes marginal prices mp per kWh, monthly fixed fees f , total electricity expenditures, and consumption levels q. 2 As indicated by the standard deviation of 0.03 Euro per kWh reported in Table 1 , price variation amounts to 15% of the average marginal price of 0.20 Euro per kWh and originates from the fact that consumers can easily change their provider and can choose among a large variety of providers offering attractive tariffs for new customers. From the billing data, we have extracted the annual electricity consumption and prices. In the frequent case that a bill does not cover the entire calender year, we have extrapolated the annual consumption on the basis of the mean consumption per day for the period for which information is available. According to our experience with conducting the GRECS, typically about two thirds of all survey households are unable to provide reliable information on their electricity bills, mostly because bills for former years are unavailable. Moreover, we have skipped observations from households that provided information for less than 30 billing days.
Nonetheless, our analysis benefits from a rich database: Overall, our estimation sample consists of 3,550 households and a total of 6,528 observations ( For the identification of the switching regression model, described in detail in Section 5, non-linearity of the specification is sufficient (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009) . For a more robust identification, it is typically recommended to impose an exclusion restriction, requiring at least one variable that in our example determines the respondents' price knowledge, yet not their electricity consumption level. To this end, we exploit the information on whether a household changed its electricity supplier during the three years prior to the survey, captured by the binary variable supplier change (Table   1) . 31% of our sample households changed their electricity supplier during the years 2011-2013 prior to the survey. It seems plausible that households searching for a new supplier gather information on tariffs and prices and, hence, become familiar with power prices. This assumption is confirmed by the first-stage results of the Switching Regression Model, which indicate a positive correlation between price knowledge and supplier change (Table 3) . Of course, this positive correlation may also reflect that price-informed households are more likely to change the supplier. Either way, the exclusion restriction that the variable supplier change is assumed to not emerge in the second-stage regression of the switching regression model allows for a more robust identification by reducing potential multi-collinearity problems in the second stage.
With 3,668 kWh, our sample households' average electricity consumption per annum roughly matches the annual consumption of a typical German household, which amounts to about 3,500 kWh according to BNetzA (2017) . In addition, with e 3,039
per month, the mean net income of our sample households is very close to the amount of e 3,069 that is reported as average income for German households in 2012 by the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis, 2015) .
Unlike electricity consumption and net income, though, there are substantial differences between our sample and the German population with respect to other variables.
For example, with 67%, the share of homeowners in our sample is far higher than the share of almost 46% that is published by the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis, 2014) . A key reason for this discrepancy is that in responding to the survey questions on electricity cost and consumption for 2012, the share of tenants who can resort to information from electricity bills is lower than the respective share of homeowners, not least due to the fact that tenants move more frequently than homeowners.
As instrument z for the likely endogenous price variable, we employ the compos- 
Panel Estimation Results
To provide for a reference case for the IV estimates, we first use standard panel estimation methods to estimate the double-log specification that is typically employed when the estimation of elasticities is at issue:
where ln(q it ) denotes the natural logarithm of the annual electricity consumption q it of household i at time t, mp stands for the marginal price, x is a vector of household characteristics, γ i denotes the household-specific effect and ε designates the error term.
The random-effects estimation results for structural Equation 3 yield a totally inelastic demand response to marginal prices (Table 2) Table   A .1 of the appendix. In what follows, we prefer reporting random-effects estimates, rather than fixed-effects results, as with respect to our IV approach fixed-effects estimations suffer from weak identification problems, because time-and household fixed effects absorb much of the variation in our instrument. This results in an implausibly large price effect, as well as a large standard error (see Table A .1).
When employing marginal prices for estimating electricity demand responses, one must recognize that prices are likely to be endogenous, as rational customers tend to select contracts that minimize their electricity costs. In fact, the average price of those 49% of our sample households that reported to have changed the electricity provider at least once in their life amounts to 25.35 cents/kWh for the years 2011 and 2012, whereas for those that have never changed the supplier the average price amounts to 26.05 cents/kWh, implying a slightly, but significantly higher average price for those sticking with their supplier (t = 8.71). In contrast, in former monopolistic markets, which prevailed before the liberalization of Germany's electricity market in 1998, households had no opportunity at all to choose their provider and tariff, but were stuck with their local electricity provider, and, thus, electricity prices were clearly exogenous to households.
Yet, the price structure of the former monopolistic era, including a monthly fixed fee, as well as a constant marginal price that is independent of consumption levels, still remains the dominant tariff today, whereas alternatives, such as package and flat-rate tariffs, are rarely offered. But as changing both suppliers and tariffs is now a common phenomenon, a simultaneity problem may arise: while, on the one hand, consumption levels tend to be affected by prices, on the other hand, households' tariff selection may depend on consumption levels.
To cope with this simultaneity problem, we pursue a panel IV approach and em-ploy the composite of the local grid and license fees as instrumental variable z for the likely endogenous marginal price, noting that a correlation coefficient of 0.23 reflects the expected positive correlation between z and marginal prices mp. This positive correlation can also be observed from the OLS estimation results of the first stage of the IV regression that is given by Equation 4:
where the marginal price mp is regressed on our instrumental variable z and the vector x of household characteristics, while ν designates another error term. Given that the estimate of coefficient β z , reported in Table 2 , is positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level, there is statistical evidence that the first assumption for valid (Table 2 ). This estimate falls on the lower end of the international evidence on electricity price elasticities (see Section 2). Yet, as elasticity estimates are hardly comparable across countries due to countryspecific heterogeneity, it is reasonable to compare our estimate with those of former German studies. While empirical evidence for Germany is rare, our price elasticity estimate is in line with Schulte and Heindl (2017) . These authors find a quite similar own-price elasticity of -0.43 for German residential electricity consumption (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , using cross-sectional data originating from Germany's Income and Expenditure Survey, which is conducted at 5-year intervals.
Much less elastic is the household response with respect to income: An increase in household net income by 10% induces an increase in electricity consumption of about 1%. While appearing low at first glance, this income elasticity estimate may be the re-sult of two opposing effects: on the one hand, as is characteristic for normal goods, the demand for electrical services increases with income. On the other hand, high household incomes allow for the opportunity to invest in new, more efficient appliances that may dampen the electricity demand (Spees and Lave, 2007) .
The outcomes of the remaining variables are largely in accord with our expectations: While homeowners, elder people, and those living in rural areas have a higher electricity consumption than other households, it is a well-known fact that, on average, households residing in East Germany consume less electricity (RWI and forsa, 2018), as well as households with a female head ( Table 2 ). Not surprisingly, household size is an important driver of electricity consumption. The electricity use of a 3-person household, for example, is 87% = 100[exp(0.628)-1] higher than that of a 1-person household.
An important drawback of IV estimates is that their standard errors are typically larger than those of the respective OLS estimates (Bauer et al., 2009:327) . In fact, if a variable that is deemed to be endogenous is instead exogenous, the IV estimator will be less efficient than the OLS estimator, while both estimators will be consistent.
If an instrument is only weakly correlated with an endogenous regressor, the loss of precision of IV estimators may be severe. Even worse is that with weak instruments, IV estimates are inconsistent and biased in the same direction as OLS estimates (Chao and Swanson, 2005) . Most disconcertingly, as is pointed out by Bound et al. (1993 Bound et al. ( , 1995 , when the instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, the cure in the form of the IV approach can be worse than the disease resulting from biased and inconsistent OLS estimates. Given these potential problems, it is reasonable to perform an endogeneity test that examines whether a potentially endogenous variable is in fact exogenous.
To this end, following the essential idea of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (Hausman, 1978) , we test whether the error term ν of Equation 4 is correlated with the error term ε of structural Equation 3. Although neither ε nor ν can be observed, one can employ the residuals of the first-and second-stage regressions and test whether they are correlated. Alternatively, one can plug the residualν as an additional regressor into structural Equation 3 and test its statistical significance (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1989) . Pursuing this approach yields a coefficient estimate -not reported here -that is significant at the 1% significance level, providing strong evidence for the endogeneity of marginal prices.
While this outcome suggests the application of the IV approach, its validity depends on the strength of our instrument. Given that the standard errors are not identically distributed, nor independent, as observations are clustered at the household level, the weakness of instruments is tested using a Wald test (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) . With an F statistic of F = 104.37 for the coefficient β z of the first-stage regression (Equation 4), which is well above the threshold of 16.38 given by Stock and Yogo (2005) , we can reject the null hypothesis of weak identification.
The Effect of Price Knowledge
To explore the potential heterogeneity in price responses with respect to price awareness, we exploit sample information on the households' knowledge about power prices and estimate price responses for two groups of households: those that were able to gauge their individual electricity price with less than 20% deviation (Group 1: price knowledge = 1) and those that were not (Group 0: price knowledge = 0). This information is used in two distinct ways: On the one hand, we separately estimate structural Equation 3 for each of these groups and, on the other hand, we employ an Endogenous Switching Regression Model (Maddala, 1983) to account for the potential nonrandomness of a household being in either of these two groups. It bears noting that, either way, we cope with the endogeneity of the marginal price in the same manner as in the previous section: by replacing marginal prices with the IV predictions originating from estimating the first stage Equation 4 of our IV approach.
The Endogenous Switching Regression Model consists of two stages, with the first stage modeling the selection into either group: Group 1 (price knowledge = 1) and Group 0 (price knowledge = 0). In our example, this selection is modeled by the following binary variable:
where w i encompasses those household characteristics that may affect whether a household is informed about prices, γ is the corresponding parameter vector, and the error term u is assumed to be correlated with both error terms η 1 and η 0 emerging from the following structural Equations 6 and 7, as there may be unobservable factors that are relevant for both the selection into either group and the consumption level.
Conditional on a household's price awareness, the households' response to price changes is described by two equations that are analogous to structural Equation 3:
where η 1 and η 0 are error terms with zero conditional mean and
represent the two variants of the inverse Mills ratios, with φ(.) and Φ(.) denoting the density and cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
When appended as extra regressors in the second-stage estimation, the inverse Mills ratios are controls for potential biases arising from sample selectivity. Selectivity is possible due to unobservable characteristics, such as carelessness about both electricity consumption and bills, that may affect both consumption levels and price aware- The probit estimation results, reported in the first column of Table 3 , indicate that whether a household changed its electricity provider during the three years prior to the interview is positively correlated with its price knowledge. Contrary to our prior, though, self selection does not seem to be an important issue here, as both coefficient estimates on the inverse Mills ratios are not statistically significant. In fact, the estimation results displayed on the right-hand panel of Table 3 are very close to the randomeffects IV estimates originating from a separate estimation of structural Equation 3 for Group 0 and Group 1 (see Table A .2 in the appendix), where selection issues are ignored.
Sample selection issues notwithstanding, both the switching regression model and separate estimations of structural Equation 3 for both price-aware and price-ignorant households indicate that households with a crude idea about current price levels (Group 1) exhibit a price-elastic demand for electricity, whereas the elasticity estimate for uninformed households (Group 0) does not differ from zero at any conventional significance level (Table 3) , a finding that is in line with e. g. Gaudin (2006) and Carter and Milon (2005) .
Policy Recommendations
Generally, the lack of price knowledge may have numerous reasons, such as inattention, high information costs, as well as search frictions (Giulietti et al., 2014; Hortaçsu et al., 2017) . The consequences of such a lack of information might be substantial, not only with respect to the environmental impact. Notably, the vanishing price responsiveness due to the lack of price awareness among a substantial fraction of households reduces market efficiency (Reiss and White, 2005) .
Our empirical results illustrate that, first, price measures might be effective in curtailing electricity consumption and its negative external effects, but, second, the effectiveness of price instruments may be substantially improved by fostering household's price awareness, for example by large-scale information campaigns that increase price transparency. Recognizing that tariffs including a fixed fee obscure the effective price consumers pay per kWh, we argue that political leaders should raise the saliency of the price issue and motivate suppliers to offer a simple tariff in their portfolio that does not include a fixed fee, but is based on a sole price element: the price per kWh.
Such a tariff, for which the per-kWh price is necessarily higher than for a tariff scheme including fixed fees, would be highly transparent and, if its introduction is advertised as an electricity-saving tariff, may help households to diminish their electricity cost and consumption, as well as the associated environmental impact. A flat tariff with constant marginal prices would be particularly advantageous for those consumers with low electricity consumption who have to bear disproportionately high electricity costs under the standard two-component tariffs including fixed fees. Furthermore, from a socio-political perspective, it is particularly desirable that such a tariff would become the default tariff and, hence, would be offered to all those who would never change their supplier or tariff. This is typical for elder people, as they commonly lack computer skills that facilitate the change of the supplier via online portals and are more risk-averse than younger people.
In the end, given the now decade-plus history of unabated electricity cost increases, coupled with the prospect that this trend will continue into the foreseeable future due to Germany's strong commitment to further support renewable energy technologies (Andor et al., 2017a) , the introduction of a highly transparent flat tariff may be a promising avenue to reduce the residential sector's electricity consumption and the associated environmental impact. According to the price response estimates presented here, the introduction of this kind of tariff will be particularly effective if it is advertised to foster transparency and to increase price awareness.
Summary and Conclusions
Consistently estimating consumer demand responses is frequently hampered by the prevalence of tariffs that include a fixed fee. Such tariffs are standard in numerous retail markets, such as telecommunications and electricity markets. The well-known endogeneity problem arising from such a tariff structure is aggravated when consumers are free to choose from a broad range of tariffs, as is common in Germany since the liberalization of European electricity markets in 1998.
To cope with the endogeneity originating from households' free tariff choice, this article has employed an instrumental-variable (IV) approach, thereby contributing to the growing literature on the price elasticity of demand for residential electricity and the role information plays in influencing customer response to price changes. Based on panel data from the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS) for the years 2011 and 2012, the IV estimate of the price elasticity of electricity demand of about -0.52 indicates that, in general, households seem to respond to power price changes.
This general conclusion, however, does not hold unequivocally: By additionally exploiting sample information on the households' knowledge about power prices and combing the IV approach with an Endogenous Switching Regression Model, we reach the more differentiated conclusion that price knowledge is crucial for demand response. In line with Wolak (2011) and Jessoe and Rapson (2014) , who find that information provision changes the price elasticity of electricity demand, our results indicate that only those households that are informed about prices are sensitive to price changes, whereas the electricity demand of uninformed households is entirely priceinelastic.
Our finding of a strong heterogeneity in households' price responsiveness suggests that further increases in power prices, which are a likely consequence of Germany's ambitious transition of its energy system (Andor et al., 2017a) , lead to substantial demand reductions and, hence, environmental benefits only if households are aware of prices and their changes. In this respect, our empirical results are in line with those of He and Reiner (2017) , who find that the moderate supplier switching behavior of British households can be partly traced to consumer's lack of attention to energy prices.
In addition to non-price interventions, such as social norm comparisons, which have proved to be cost-effective in the U. S. (Allcott, 2011) , we therefore propose fos-20 tering low-cost information measures to increase the price awareness of households, not least because providing price information has the potential to improve market efficiency. Most notably, although utilities in a liberalized market are free in their electricity tariff design, we argue that political leaders should motivate suppliers to offer a simple tariff entailing a flat marginal price as the sole price element and couple this with large-scale public information campaigns targeted at consumers. Such a tariff, for which the per-kWh price is necessarily higher than for a tariff scheme including fixed fees, would be highly transparent and may help price-aware households to diminish their electricity cost and consumption, as well as the associated environmental impact, particularly if its introduction is advertised as an electricity-saving tariff. Note: Standard errors are bootstrapped; * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Appendix
Employed number of observations per household: 1,84.
